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National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios and the
Foreign Relations Effects Test: Searching for a Viable
Approach
I. INTRODUCTION
The Massachusetts Burma1 Law2 marked a significant development in the foray of U.S. states and other subnational entities into
the realm of foreign affairs. As its sponsor, State Representative
Byron Rushing, noted, the Massachusetts Burma Law (the first state
statute of its kind) “brought state government into the international
movement to support democracy in Burma”3 by imposing on Burma
economic sanctions intended to “vigorously combat welldocumented [governmental] repression and intolerance.”4 More

1. The country of Burma derives its name from the Burman ethnic group that constitutes the majority of the population living in the region between India and Thailand. See
Myanmar or Burma?, in BURMA: PROSPECTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC FUTURE vii, vii (Robert I.
Rotberg ed., 1998). The name Burma has been associated with this area since the nineteenth
century, when the area was divided into Upper Burma, Lower Burma, and the hill territories.
See id. In the late nineteenth century, British colonial rule consolidated the three sectors into
one country called Burma. See MARTIN SMITH, BURMA: INSURGENCY AND THE POLITICS OF
ETHNICITY 40 (2d ed. 1999). Following independence from Great Britain in January 1948,
the country retained the name Burma until the present military regime changed it to Myanmar
in June 1989. See Burma Takes Another Name: Now, the Union of Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES, June
20, 1989, at A5. The name “Myanmar” is a contraction of the Burmese name for the country:
“Myanmar naing-ngan,” meaning “nation of the swift and strong people.” See U Kyaw Win,
Brutality in Burma, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1992, at A10.
In keeping with the prevalent scholarly practice of not using a name “invented by a regime that has no national legitimacy,” this Note will use the name Burma instead of Myanmar.
Myanmar or Burma?, in BURMA: PROSPECTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC FUTURE, supra at vii; see
also Rudy Guyon, Comment, Violent Repression in Burma: Human Rights and the Global Response, 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 409, 410 n.1 (1992) (supporting the use of the name
Burma “out of deference to the viewpoint that to [refer to the country as Myanmmar] lends
legitimacy to a military junta whose thuggery and innumerable violations of human rights law
continue to bring suffering to all the peoples of Burma”).
2. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 22(G)-(M) (West 1999). For a more detailed
explanation of the statute’s provisions, see infra Part II.B.
3. Frank Phillips, Weld Expected to Sign Bill to Avoid Firms with Burma Ties, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 21, 1996, at A30.
4. Letter from Representative Byron Rushing to Representative Christopher Hodgkins
and Senator Warren Tolman, Committee of State Administration (Feb. 28, 1995) [hereinafter
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specifically, the Massachusetts Burma Law sought to pressure
Burma’s ruling military regime into ending its repressive practices
and making democratic reforms. The law established so-called “selective-purchasing” regulations5 that would bar the state from buying
goods and services from companies doing business in Burma. In effect, such regulations would function as a secondary boycott against
the Burmese government that would encourage companies falling
within the regulations’ scope to desist their operations in Burma and
thereby deprive the regime of badly needed foreign investment.6 Due
to the law’s potential to “affect millions of dollars in state business” 7
and act as an example for Congress and other states to follow, the
law’s supporters considered it “more than symbolic action”8 in their
efforts to “assist[] fledgling, democratic movements throughout the
world.”9

Rushing Letter], quoted in Daniel M. Price & John P. Hannah, The Constitutionality of United
States State and Local Sanctions, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 443, 462 (1998).
5. Selective-purchasing laws and regulations, also known as “selective contracting
laws,” Frank Phillips, Mass. Poised to Act on Burma Sanction Bill Said to Interest Weld, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 11, 1996, at A33 [hereinafter Mass. Poised to Act], attempt to use state or local
governments’ economic influence to protest the practices and policies of foreign nations. In
brief, such laws “either preclude companies that do business with a targeted regime from bidding on government contracts, or award bidding preferences to companies that do not do
business with the regime.” Matthew C. Porterfield, State and Local Foreign Policy Initiatives
and Free Speech: The First Amendment as an Instrument of Federalism, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1,
6 (1999) (footnote omitted). The Massachusetts Burma Law falls into the first category of selective purchasing laws. See infra Part II.B (discussing the provisions of the Massachusetts
Burma Law).
6. See Frank Phillips, Apple Cites Mass. Law in Burma Decision, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct.
4, 1996, at B6 (quoting Representative Byron Rushing’s comment that Apple Computers’ decision to end its operations in Burma due to the Massachusetts Burma Law accomplished “exactly what we want[ed] this law to do”); see also Jon Marcus, Massachusetts Legislators Call for
Ban on Burma Business, Assoc. Press Pol. Service, June 11, 1996, available in Westlaw, Wires
File, 1996 WL 5388343 (quoting Representative Byron Rushing’s statement that “[o]ne of
the reasons [selective purchase requirements have] become such an important strategy . . . is
that the government [of Burma] is running out of money so they have started to try to increase
foreign investment”).
7. Meg Vaillancourt, Mass. Becomes First State to Boycott Burma Business, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 26, 1996, at A27 (quoting Massachusetts Governor William F. Weld); see also
Phillips, supra note 5, at A33 (“[State Representative Rushing] said that despite the modest
amount of funds involved in a Massachusetts sanctions bill on Burma, [approximately $1 million in state contracts,] it would have far-reaching impact, including reviving efforts in Congress to pass a similar national ‘selective contracting’ bill on Burma.”).
8. Vaillancourt, supra note 7, at A27.
9. Rushing Letter, supra note 4, at 462.
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Unfortunately for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, two Article III courts have declared the Massachusetts Burma Law to be an
unconstitutional usurpation of federal authority, particularly in the
domain of foreign affairs. In November 1998, a federal district court
judge in Massachusetts awarded a declaratory judgment against Massachusetts, holding the law to be unconstitutional under the United
States Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in Zschernig v. Miller,10 because the Massachusetts Burma Law “impermissibly infringe[d] on
the federal government’s power to regulate foreign affairs.”11 Then,
in National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios,12 the First Circuit
Court of Appeals, in June 1999, affirmed the district court’s decision
by agreeing that under Zschernig the Massachusetts “law interferes
with the foreign affairs power of the federal government.”13 Moreover, in reviewing alternative arguments not reached by the trial
court, the First Circuit also found that the Massachusetts Burma Law
unconstitutionally encroached on federal authority by violating the
Foreign Commerce Clause and was preempted by existing federal
sanctions against Burma.14 Notably, however, the First Circuit’s decision to affirm the trial court’s ruling rested on its interpretation and
treatment of the federal government’s authority over foreign affairs
rather than its conclusions regarding the law’s validity under the
Foreign Commerce Clause or federal preemption arguments.15
Though the First Circuit’s opinion in Natsios appears to reject
emphatically the validity of state-imposed economic sanctions while
simultaneously severely constricting subnational entities’ ability to
participate in the international arena, the fact that the United States
Supreme Court recently granted both parties’ petitions to review the
case16 suggests that the decision still contains some unsettled issues,

10. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
11. National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 289 (D. Mass.
1998), aff’d, National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999).
12. 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. granted, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999).
13. Id. at 45.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 77.
16. See Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999);
see also 14 States Ask U.S. High Court to Restore ‘Burma Law,’ PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 21, 1999,
at D7 (reporting that Massachusetts, supported by fourteen other states, asked the Supreme
Court to hear the case and restore the Massachusetts Burma law); Group Opposed to Burma
Law Doesn’t Oppose Supreme Court Hearing, Associated Press Newswires, Oct. 28, 1999,
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particularly with respect to the constitutional relationship between
federalism and foreign affairs.17 Indeed, a close examination of the
First Circuit’s analysis of the case’s foreign affairs-related arguments
reveals that the court’s construction of the federalism-foreign affairs
relationship is flawed in several significant ways. For example, the
court’s analysis of the federalism-foreign affairs relationship fails to
give definite guidance for determining the scope of the connection
between federalism and foreign affairs.18 Moreover, the court’s approach fails to incorporate, or at least adequately account for, recent
trends in the law with respect to federalism, the end of the Cold
War, and global interdependence. Though it remains unclear
whether the First Circuit would have upheld the Massachusetts
Burma Law under a construction that accounted for such factors, the
court’s failure to employ such an approach in this case preserves the
“vagueness within this area of jurisprudence [that] fosters inconsistent judicial determinations as to which state laws infringe upon the
federal government’s . . . foreign affairs power.”19
This Comment contends that in National Foreign Trade Council
v. Natsios, the First Circuit construed the federalism-foreign affairs
relationship too broadly to effectively determine the constitutionality

available in Westlaw, APWIRES File, 10/28/99, APWIRES 23:28:00 [hereinafter Group Opposed to Burma Law] (noting that the NFTC asked the Supreme Court to hear the case for the
benefit of international trade concerns “if [the Court] believes the issues it raises are unsettled”); Frank Phillips, Court to Rule on Mass. Law Targeting Ties with Burma, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov, 30, 1999, at B2 (“In a move that could have far-reaching implications for states
that seek to punish human rights abuses abroad, the US Supreme Court yesterday agreed to
review the Massachusetts law that restricts state purchases from companies doing business in
Burma.”).
17. See Group Opposed to Burma Law, supra note 16, at 23:28:00 (“[In asking the Supreme Court to hear the case,] [t]he NFTC further argued that the case of Massachusetts’
Burma law would be an appropriate vehicle for resolving questions of whether state and local
governments have the right to forbid trade with companies doing business with selected foreign governments.”). In other words, the NFTC asked the Supreme Court to hear the case in
part because, even though the First Circuit declared the Massachusetts law to be unconstitutional, the court failed to provide a definite rule as to whether federalism endows subnational
entities with a constitutional right to engage in foreign affairs and foreign policymaking by imposing economic sanctions on selected foreign countries.
18. One commentator made a similar criticism about the district court’s decision in National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker. See Recent Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 2013, 2014
(1999) (“By failing to articulate the specific ways in which the Burma Law had ‘more than an
incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries,’ the court missed a crucial opportunity to clarify current jurisprudence regarding state involvement in foreign affairs.”).
19. Id. at 2015.
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of state-imposed economic sanctions.20 Part II summarizes the political and human rights situation in Burma that prompted the enactment of the Massachusetts Burma Law, the law’s provisions, and the
law’s relationship to “constituent diplomacy”21 and related jurisprudence. Part III discusses the facts of Natsios and the First Circuit’s
reasoning therein. Part IV analyzes the First Circuit’s construction of
the federalism-foreign affairs relationship and determines that (1) in
light of both globalization and the Supreme Court’s recent views of
federalism, the First Circuit’s narrow approach is flawed and (2) the
First Circuit should have employed a limited balancing approach that
determines whether a subnational entity provides the appropriate political context in which decisions relating to foreign affairs can be
made.

20. Thus, unlike the majority of scholarship dealing with either the Massachusetts
Burma law or subnationally-imposed economic sanctions, this Comment will not explore the
constitutionality of either the Massachusetts Burma Law or state-imposed sanctions in general.
Examples of works that do explore such topics include: Brannon P. Denning & Jack H.
McCall, Jr., The Constitutionality of State and Local “Sanctions” Against Foreign Countries:
Affairs of State, States’ Affairs, or a Sorry State of Affairs?, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 307
(1999) (arguing that state-imposed sanctions are unconstitutional); Howard N. Fenton, III,
The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions,
13 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 563 (1993) (discussing the inappropriateness and unconstitutionality of local sanctions); Lynn Loschin & Jennifer Anderson, Massachusetts Challenges the Burmese Dictators: The Constitutionality of Selective Purchasing Laws, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
373 (1999) (supporting the constitutionality of the Massachusetts Burma law); Price & Hannah, supra note 4 (arguing that state and local sanctions are unconstitutional); David
Schmahmann & James Finch, The Unconstitutionality of State and Local Enactments in the
United States Restricting Business Ties with Burma (Myanmar), 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
175 (1997); Joel P. Trachtman, Nonactor States in U.S. Foreign Relations?: The Massachusetts
Burma Law, 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROCEEDINGS 350 (1998) (leaning toward the view that
the Massachusetts Burma law is constitutional); Alejandra Carvajal, Note, State and Local “Free
Burma” Laws: The Case for Sub-National Trade Sanctions, 29 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 257
(1998); Jay A. Christofferson, Comment, The Constitutionality of State Laws Prohibiting Contractual Relations with Burma: Upholding Federalism’s Purpose, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 351
(1998) (arguing that state sanctions are constitutional); Shawna Fullerton, Note, State Foreign
Policy: The Legitimacy of the Massachusetts Burma Law, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 249 (1999)
(defending the Massachusetts Burma law as constitutional); Jennifer Loeb-Cederwall, Note,
Restrictions on Trade with Burma: Bold Moves or Foolish Acts?, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 929
(1998) (arguing that the Massachusetts Burma law is unconstitutional).
21. John Kincaid, Constituent Diplomacy: U.S. State Roles in Foreign Affairs, in
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND POWER-SHARING IN THE POST–MODERN EPOCH 107, 107
(Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1991).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Military Rule and Human Rights in Burma
Burma has endured the harshness and brutality of authoritarian
military rule for the majority of its existence as an independent state.
The current regime, which calls itself the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC),22 is the target of the Massachusetts Burma
Law. The SPDC came to power in September 1988, succeeding the
twenty-one-year authoritarian reign of General Ne Win.23 In the
months preceding the SPDC’s ascent to power, widespread prodemocracy protests had prompted Ne Win to step down as head of
the military-dominated government, resulting in the appointment of
a civilian in his stead. As protests continued, the SPDC led a savage
coup to restore military control, killing thousands of people in the
process.
According to one scholar, the SPDC’s authoritarian methods of
governance are best described as “a throwback to an earlier, more
22. In late 1997, the regime changed its name from the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) to the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). See Carvajal,
supra note 20, at 257 (footnote omitted).
23. After staging a “constitutional coup” and ruling Burma through a caretaker government from 1958 to 1960, General Ne Win returned to power in 1962 through a coupd’etat and established an authoritarian, military-dominated socialist government. MYA SAW
SHIN & TOM L. WILSON, BURMA/MYANMAR: U.S. POLICY AT THE CROSSROADS 5 (1996),
reprinted in The Burma Freedom and Democracy Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 1511 Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 115 (1996). As mentioned
above, in 1988, Ne Win stepped down in response to protests originating from a growing prodemocracy movement within Burma. Though scholars disagree as to his precise relationship
with the present regime, they agree that Ne Win exerts at least some degree of influence on the
SPDC. Compare Guyon, supra note 1, at 416 (The SPDC “coup was a façade; Ne Win maintained control of government . . . from behind the scenes.”) (footnote omitted), with Robert I.
Rotberg, Prospects for a Democratic Burma, in BURMA: PROSPECTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC
FUTURE, supra note 1, at 3 (“Now nearly ninety, [Ne Win] still wields occasional authority
from the background.”); see also Andrew Selth, The Armed Forces and Military Rule in Burma,
in BURMA: PROSPECTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC FUTURE, supra note 1, at 100-01 (“To a large
extent, the aging Ne Win no longer exercises day-to-day control over the government and
armed forces, and his standing among the younger generation in the tatmadaw is nowhere near
as great as it may have once been. As an historical figure prominent in Burma’s early struggles
against ethnic and ideological insurgents, however, and later chief of the country’s armed
forces, the ‘Old Man’ still commands a degree of respect and loyalty in military circles. More
importantly, he has for many years seeded the army with like-minded proteges. . . . Ne Win is
now old and infirm, and his power is on the wane. Until his death, however, he will continue
to exercise influence over the [SPDC’s] policies and act to protect his favorites from jealous
rivals.”) (footnote omitted).
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nakedly brutal period of dictatorial excess.”24 A number of international bodies (including the United Nations) and human rights organizations “consistently rank the [SPDC] as among the worst regimes for its lack of respect for human rights.”25 Reported human
rights violations include “[m]urder and [s]ummary [e]xecution,”26
“[s]ystematic [r]acial [d]iscrimination,”27 forcible eviction and population relocation,28 “[p]rolonged [a]rbitrary [d]etention,”29 torture,30
rape,31 and “[p]ortering,”32 among other forms of forced labor.33 In
all, the SPDC’s human rights practices violate the human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter and five other international
treaties considered legally binding on Burma, as well as established
norms of customary international law.34
Although the United Nations and many countries have repeatedly and firmly condemned the SPDC’s human rights abuses, the
overall “international response [to the situation] has at best been
mixed”:35 some nations have imposed economic sanctions against the
regime while others have maintained or expanded their economic activities with or in Burma.36 In 1996 and 1997, the United States
24. Rotberg, supra note 23, at 1.
25. SHIN & WILSON, supra note 23, at 14, reprinted in The Burma Freedom and Democracy Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 1511 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 124 (1996).
26. Guyon, supra note 1, at 424.
27. Id. at 425.
28. See id. at 426.
29. Id. at 426.
30. See id. at 427.
31. See id. at 427-28.
32. Id. at 428. “Portering” involves the abduction of civilians, usually of minority ethnic
groups, to physically carry ammunition and supplies for army units. See id.
33. See SHIN & WILSON, supra note 23, at 13, reprinted in The Burma Freedom and
Democracy Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 1511 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and
Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 115 (1996).
34. See Guyon, supra note 1, at 428-37 (examining the manner in which Burma’s human rights practices violate the United Nations Charter, the Convention on the Prevention of
Genocide, the Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention, the ILO Convention Concerning
Forced Labour, the ILO Convention Concerning the Rights of Association and Combination
of Agricultural Workers, the Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection
of the Right to Organize, and precepts of customary international law).
35. Id. at 444.
36. See id. at 444-58 (examining the manner in which various countries (especially Asian
countries), international organizations, and multinational corporations have maintained or increased their economic ties with, and calling for the imposition of more and stronger sanctions
against, Burma).
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joined the ranks of those countries using economic sanctions by barring financial assistance to Burma and prohibiting all future United
States investment there.37 As the First Circuit observed in its discussion of federal preemption in National Foreign Trade Council v.
Natsios,38 the federal government’s measures were less severe in their
scope than those established by the Massachusetts Burma Law.39
B. The Massachusetts Burma Law
Signed into law some three months before Congress approved
national sanctions against Burma,40 the Massachusetts Burma Law41
sought to “vigorously combat well-documented [governmental] repression and intolerance in Burma”42 while encouraging Congress to
impose similar measures.43 Notably, the law received such strong
support from both houses of the Massachusetts state legislature “that
it [would] likely [have] become law [through a veto override], even
if [Governor William F.] Weld [had] vetoed it.”44
On account of its status as a selective purchasing law, the Massachusetts Burma Law severely restricted the ability of both the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and its agents to procure approximately
one million dollars worth of goods or services45 from individuals or
companies engaged in business in or with Burma. Simply put, the
law prohibited state entities and agents from making such purchases
from any entity included on a state-maintained46 “restricted purchase
37. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §
570(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-166 to -167 (1996) (barring United States assistance to
Burma); Exec. Order No. 13,047, 31 C.F.R. pt. 537 (1999) (prohibiting “United States persons” from making, approving, or facilitating for non-United States persons new investment in
Burma). In issuing the Executive Order, President Clinton acted pursuant to authority granted
him by Congress to impose conditional sanctions on Burma. See § 570(b), 110 Stat. at 3009167 (authorizing the president to impose conditional sanctions on Burma).
38. 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. granted, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999).
39. See id. at 75 (“Some actions lawful under federal law would be unlawful under the
state statute.”).
40. Massachusetts Governor William F. Weld signed the Burma bill into law on June 25,
1996. See Vaillancourt, supra note 7, at A27.
41. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 22(G)-(M) (West 1999).
42. Rushing Letter, supra note 4, at 462.
43. See Phillips, supra note 5, at A33.
44. Id.
45. See id. (quoting State Representative Rushing’s estimate that the Massachusetts
Burma Law will not affect much more than $1 million in state contracts).
46. The law requires the state Secretary of Administration and Finance to compile the
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list,”47 comprised of individuals or corporations determined to be
“doing business with Burma (Myanmar).”48 As defined by the law,
“doing business in Burma” embraced a broad range of activities, including:
(a) having a principal place of business, place of incorporation
or . . . corporate headquarters in Burma (Myanmar) or having
any operations, leases, franchises, majority-owned subsidiaries,
distribution agreements, or any other similar agreements in
Burma (Myanmar), or being the majority-owned subsidiary, licensee or franchise of such a person;
(b) providing financial services to the government of Burma
(Myanmar), including providing direct loans, underwriting
government securities, providing any consulting advice or assistance, providing brokerage services, acting as a trustee or escrow agent, or otherwise acting as an agent pursuant to a contractual agreement;
(c) promoting the importation or sale of gems, timber, oil, gas or
other related products, commerce in which is largely controlled
by the government of Burma (Myanmar), from Burma
(Myanmar);
(d) providing any goods or services to the government of Burma
(Myanmar).49

Notably, the state could purchase goods or services from a party
found to be “doing business in Burma” when “the procurement
[was] essential”50 and compliance with the general rule “would
[have] eliminate[d] the only bid or offer, or would [have] result[ed]
in inadequate competition.”51 However, the procurement contract
could be awarded to such a party “only if there [were] no

restricted purchase list and update it every three months using various public and private reports and similar sources. See ch. 7, § 22(J)(a)-(c). The Secretary must also provide copies of
the list to all state entities. See id. at § 22(J)(d).
47. Id. at § 22(H)(a).
48. Id. at § 22(J)(a).
49. Id. at § 22(G).
50. Id. at § 22(H)(b)(1).
51. Id. at § 22(H)(b)(2).
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comparable low bid or offer by a person who [was] not on the restricted purchase list.”52
With respect to relevant procedural norms, the law obligates
state entities to provide advance notice of the law’s requirements to
all parties that desire to bid on state contracts.53 Moreover, prior to
reviewing multiple bids or awarding a contract to an only bidder, the
awarding entity needs to receive a declaration from the bidder’s/offeror’s “authorized representative” stating “the nature and
extent to which [the bidding party was] engaging in activities which
would subject said person to inclusion on the restricted purchase
list.”54
C. “Constituent Diplomacy,” 55 Federalism, and Foreign Affairs
Despite its status as the first state statute to impose economic
sanctions on Burma, the Massachusetts Burma Law itself cannot be
considered an innovation in the relationship between federalism and
United States foreign affairs law. During the past thirty years, state
and local governments have substantially increased their participation
in “foreign affairs activities conducted by constituent governments
and subnational entities,” a phenomenon aptly dubbed “constituent
diplomacy.”56 In 1986, one report estimated that “more than 1000
U.S. state and local governments of all political stripes are participating in foreign affairs, and their numbers are expanding.”57 Today,
thanks in part to such factors as heightened subnational desire for
constituent autonomy,58 increasing global interdependence,59 the
growing complexity of the international arena,60 and the governmentalization of the international marketplace,61 constituent diplomacy
touches a wide range of activities, including efforts to pursue interna-

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at § 22(H)(d).
See id. at § 22(H)(c).
Id.
Kincaid, supra note 21, at 107.
Id.
Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 115, 115 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1990) (footnote
omitted).
58. See Kincaid, supra note 21, at 108-11.
59. See id. at 111-13.
60. See id. at 113-15.
61. See id. at 115-17.
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tional trade and investment,62 expressing opinions on national foreign policy,63 and, “[p]erhaps most dramatically,” imposing “economic sanctions on foreign governments. . . through, for example,
selective purchasing laws.”64 The Massachusetts Burma Law, therefore, cannot be considered more than constituent diplomacy in action.
“Somewhat surprisingly,” one scholar noted, “despite the scope
and extent of this recent state and local involvement in foreign affairs, it has occasioned little reaction from Congress or the Executive
and few cases in the courts.”65 The lack of federal resistance has undoubtedly benefited constituent diplomacy efforts by allowing them
to proceed uninhibited. At the same time, however, the lack of federal involvement—especially the lack of cases challenging the validity
of these constituent diplomacy endeavors—has allowed the jurisprudence delineating the constitutional relationship and boundaries between federalism and foreign affairs to remain vague,66 “uncertain,”67
and “amorphous.”68 Consequently, there exists a very real risk that
inconsistent judicial conclusions regarding which state actions unlawfully encroach on the federal government’s foreign affairs power
could “grant constitutional validation of some state laws that interfere with a unified national foreign affairs agenda.”69
D. Supreme Court Precedent: Zschernig v. Miller
Courts and scholars agree that the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Zschernig v. Miller,70 though decided in 1968, “most directly considered the boundaries of permissible state activity in the foreign affairs
context.”71 In Zschernig, the Court invalidated an Oregon statute
that allowed nonresident aliens to inherit real property from a state
62. See Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV.
1089, 1097-98 (1999).
63. See id.
64. Id. at 1098.
65. Bilder, supra note 57, at 117.
66. See Recent Cases, supra note 18, at 2015.
67. A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J.
INT’L L. 1, 27 (1995).
68. Loschin & Anderson, supra note 20, at 400.
69. Recent Cases, supra note 18, at 2015.
70. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
71. National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 51 (1st Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999).
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resident only if (1) the alien’s country permitted United States citizens to inherit real property and (2) the alien beneficiaries enjoyed
the right to have the property without the risk that their country
might confiscate the inheritance.72 In holding the Oregon statute invalid, the Court distinguished the case before it from Clark v. Allen,73 a previous decision in which the Court had upheld a similar
California reciprocity statute.74 The difference between the two cases,
according to the Court, stemmed from “the posture of the present
[Zschernig case]”:75 Clark focused on the statute’s facial validity, but
the [Zschernig] challenge to the Oregon statute involved “the manner of [the statute’s] application.”76
To support its holding that the Oregon statute was “an intrusion
by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution
entrusts to the President and the Congress,”77 the Court determined
that the statute “ha[d] more than ‘some incidental or indirect effect
in foreign countries,’ and . . . great potential for disruption or embarrassment” of national foreign policy.78 Though the Court failed
to define the precise parameters of this so-called “foreign relations
effects test,”79 the Court identified several facts that, in its view, either directly affected foreign countries or exposed U.S. foreign policy
to potential embarrassment or disruption. These factors included the
fact that (1) the efforts of the Oregon courts to apply the Oregon
law had led state court judges to criticize foreign governments,
statements of foreign diplomats, and the administration of foreign
law,80 (2) probate courts of various states also had made disparaging
comments about foreign governments while deciding cases involving
similar inheritance statutes,81 and (3) in a separate case, the government of Bulgaria had contacted the State Department and objected
to the Oregon law.82 Significantly, the Court held the Oregon stat72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430-31.
331 U.S. 503 (1947).
See id. at 516-17.
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433.
Id.
Id. at 432.
Id. at 434-35.
Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70
U. COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1396 (1999).
80. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434-36.
81. See id. at 438 n.8.
82. See id. at 437 n.7. Interestingly enough, commentators such as Professor Harold G.
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ute unconstitutional even though the statute pertained to probate
matters, an area traditionally left to the state; conflicted with no
treaty or federal law; and had been characterized by the Justice Department as not “unduly interfer[ing] with the United States’ conduct of foreign relations.”83
Zschernig thus established a general framework for analyzing the
propriety of state involvement in foreign affairs by establishing a factually specific “foreign relations effects test”84 to be applied to the
state action in question. The overall value of the framework, however, remains debatable, because Zschernig failed to determine the
framework’s scope or requirements. In effect, Zschernig is the cause
of much of the confusion relating to the federalism-foreign affairs relationship. Consequently, as might be predicted, courts have varied
in their approach to how the foreign effects test should be construed
under Zschernig.85

Maier have argued the Zschernig Court erred in its application of these factors to the facts of
the case: “No one of these conclusions is effectively supported by the facts in the Zschernig
case. There was no showing of an adverse effect on relations with East Germany and no evidence of overt or implicit criticism of the East German Government by any of the Oregon
courts . . . .” Harold G. Maier, Preemption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis, 83 AM. J.
INT’L L. 832, 836 (1989).
83. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434.
84. See Goldsmith, supra note 79, at 1396.
85. Compare, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989) (upholding the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance requiring divestment by city workers’ pension fund of investments in companies doing business in South Africa), with Springfield Rare
Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300 (Ill. 1986) (invalidating an Illinois state statute that excluded South African coins from state tax exemptions applying to coins and currency
circulated by other countries). See also Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903 (3d
Cir. 1990) (upholding a Pennsylvania state “Buy American” statute under Zschernig because
the law did not require state officials or judges to appraise the policies of other nations, and
treated all foreign countries in the same fashion); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm’rs,
80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (Ct. App. 1969) (declaring a California “Buy American” statute unconstitutional under Zschernig because the law presented “great potential for disruption” with established federal trade policies); K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply
Comm’n, 381 A.2d 774 (N.J. 1977) (holding a New Jersey state “Buy American” law to be
constitutional under Zschernig because the law did not involve any criticism of foreign governments).
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III. NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL V. NATSIOS
A. The Facts
In the trial court phase of Natsios,86 the National Foreign Trade
Council (NFTC), a nonprofit, Washington, D.C.-based organization
with over 600 corporate members,87 brought suit against Charles D.
Baker, then Secretary of Administration and Finance of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and other state officers in their official
capacity as state officials, claiming that the Massachusetts Burma Law
was invalid.88 The NFTC specifically claimed that the law “(1) intrudes on the federal government’s exclusive power to regulate foreign affairs; (2) discriminates against and burdens international trade
in violation of the Foreign Commerce Clause; and (3) is preempted
by a federal statute and an executive order imposing sanctions on
Myanmar.”89 The defendants challenged the NFTC’s claims, arguing
that the case should be dismissed because no members of the NFTC
had been injured by the Massachusetts Burma Law and therefore the
NFTC lacked standing to sue.90 Even if the NFTC had standing to
sue, the defendants argued that the Massachusetts Burma Law was
not invalid because (1) it did not intrude on the federal government’s federal affairs power,91 (2) federal law imposing sanctions on
Burma did not conflict with and preempt the Massachusetts Burma
Law,92 and (3) Massachusetts’ status as a market participant removed
the law from under the Foreign Commerce Clause.93

86. National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998),
aff’d, National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. granted,
Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999).
87. See Group Opposed to Burma Law, supra note 16.
88. See Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 289. Like the district court in Baker and the First Circuit in Natsios, this Note will refer to the defendant as the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
rather than Mr. Baker or Mr. Natsios.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 291.
92. See id. at 293.
93. See id.
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After finding that plaintiff NFTC had standing to sue,94 the district court granted summary judgment to NFTC based on the
court’s interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Zschernig v.
Miller, which, according to the district court, held that state laws are
invalid if they have “more than ‘some incidental or indirect effect in
foreign countries,’ or . . . ‘great potential for disruption or embarrassment’ of United States foreign policy.”95 In justifying its decision
under Zschernig, the district court stated that the Massachusetts statute “unconstitutionally impinges on the federal government’s exclusive authority to regulate foreign affairs [because it] has more than
an ‘indirect or incidental effect in foreign countries,’ and a ‘great potential for disruption or embarrassment.’”96 Notably, the district
court declined to include in its holding any reference to NFTC’s
Foreign Commerce Clause and federal preemption claims, noting
that “neither argument is dispositive in this case.”97 On behalf of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Andrew S. Natsios, Baker’s successor as Secretary of Administration and Finance, appealed the district court’s ruling to the First Circuit Court of Appeals.98
B. The Court’s Reasoning
In affirming summary judgment, the First Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling under three separate analyses.99 The court first
sustained the district court’s finding that the law was invalid under
Zschernig because it unconstitutionally encroached on the federal
government’s foreign affairs authority.100 Then, accepting the opportunity to review the alternative claims deemed “not dispositive” by
the district court, the First Circuit also found the law to be invalid

94. See id. at 289-90 (concluding that NFTC satisfied the Supreme Court’s three-part
test for organizational standing as outlined in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n,
432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).
95. Id. at 290 (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1968)).
96. Id. at 291 (citation omitted).
97. Id. at 293.
98. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 44-45 (1st Cir. 1999),
cert. granted, Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999).
99. See id. at 44.
100. See id.
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because it violated the Foreign Commerce Clause101 and was preempted by existing federal law.102
1. The federal government’s foreign affairs power
In sustaining the district court’s holding that the Massachusetts
Burma Law unconstitutionally infringed on the federal government’s
authority over foreign affairs, the First Circuit divided Massachusetts’
assertions into two sets of arguments: “preliminary arguments” relating to the district court’s interpretation of Zschernig 103 and
“[a]dditional [a]rguments [r]egarding the [f]oreign [a]ffairs
[p]ower.”104
a. Arguments relating to Zschernig. With respect to Massachusetts’ Zschernig-related “preliminary arguments,” the court first rejected Massachusetts’ argument that the district court incorrectly interpreted Zschernig. Contrary to Massachusetts’ claims, the court
stated, Zschernig does not “instruct[] courts to balance the nation’s
interests in a unified foreign policy against the particular interests of
an individual state. Instead, Zschernig stands for the principle that
there is a threshold level of involvement in and impact on foreign affairs which the states may not exceed.”105
The court then proceeded to refute Massachusetts’ argument
that Natsios should be distinguished from Zschernig due to alleged
key factual differences. Rejecting Massachusetts’ assertion that the
Massachusetts Burma Law did not establish the level and frequency
of scrutiny found in the law in question in Zschernig, the First Circuit
employed the Zschernig court’s approach of identifying various factors that, in its view, either directly affected foreign countries or exposed national foreign policy to potential embarrassment or disruption.106 As the court noted,
The conclusion that the Massachusetts law has more than an incidental or indirect effect on foreign relations is dictated by the combination of factors present here: (1) the design and intent of the
law is to affect the affairs of a foreign country; (2) Massachusetts,

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

764

See id.
See id.
See id. at 52-59.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 52.
For a list of the factual factors identified by the Zschernig court, see supra Part II.D.
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with it $2 billion in total annual purchasing power by scores of
state authorities and agencies, is in a position to effectuate that design and intent and has had an effect; (3) the effects of the law may
well be magnified should Massachusetts prove to be a bellwether
for other states (and other governments); (4) the law has resulted
in serious protests from other countries, ASEAN, and the European
Union; and (5) Massachusetts has chosen a course divergent in at
least five ways from the federal law, thus raising the prospect of
embarrassment for the country.107

It should be emphasized that the only factor common to the findings
of both the First Circuit and the Zschernig court involved the existence of foreign countries’ objections to the law at issue.
After briefly demonstrating how its approach in Natsios “is
largely consistent with that taken by the few other courts that have
considered challenges to state and local laws brought under Zschernig,”108 the First Circuit denied Massachusetts’ final Zschernigrelated argument: the Supreme Court’s decision in Barclays Bank
PLC v. Franchise Tax Board 109 “means that only Congress, not the
courts, should ever determine whether a state law interferes with the
foreign affairs power of the federal government.”110 In Barclays, the
Supreme Court upheld a California state law establishing reporting
requirements to be used in calculating corporate franchise taxes of
multinational corporations, holding, in part, that only Congress has
the authority “to evaluate whether the national interest is best served
by tax uniformity, or state autonomy.”111 The First Circuit, however,
held that Barclays does not apply to the foreign affairs power analysis
because (1) the absence of both a state law that targeted another nation and a claim that a state “was engaging in foreign policy”112 distinguished Barclays from Natsios and (2) “the Supreme Court did
not cite to Zschernig in Barclays, thus keeping separate the analyses
that apply when examining laws under the Foreign Commerce
Clause and under the foreign affairs power.”113

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Natsios, 181 F.3d at 53.
Id. at 55.
512 U.S. 298 (1994).
Natsios, 181 F.3d at 58.
Barclays, 512 U.S. at 331.
Natsios, 181 F.3d at 59.
Id.
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b. Arguments relating to the foreign affairs power. Having disposed of Massachusetts’ Zschernig-based arguments, the First Circuit
then quickly rejected several arguments that attempted to shield the
Massachusetts Burma Law under three weighty constitutional doctrines. First, the court dismissed the “novel argument” that “the
Massachusetts Burma Law can be upheld by applying a market participant exception”114 to the foreign affairs power as interpreted in
Zschernig.115 In declining to accept Massachusetts’ contention that
the market participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause
should be extended to the Foreign Commerce Clause and then to
the foreign affairs power, the court noted that not only did the idea
lack direct precedential support but it also ran contrary to the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the market participant exception.116
Second, the court then ruled that the Tenth Amendment does
not protect the Massachusetts Burma Law. Massachusetts, the court
concluded, had waived any direct Tenth Amendment claim it might
have had by raising the argument only in a short footnote.117 However, even if Massachusetts had not waived such a claim, the court
found that the Tenth Amendment still did not apply to Natsios because (1) the district court’s decision did not, contrary to Massachusetts’ suggestion, compel the state to do business with members of
the NFTC and (2) even if such compulsion existed, it was “not similar to the federal government compulsion of states found impermissible” under the Tenth Amendment.118
Lastly, the First Circuit rejected the argument that the First
Amendment should shield the Massachusetts Burma Law. Rather
than suggesting that the First Amendment protects the Massachu-

114. Id. The “market participant exception” is a judicially-created exception to the dormant Commerce Clause, see LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 430-34
(2d ed., 1988), which is itself a judicial creation that prevents states from unduly burdening or
discriminating against interstate commerce. Id. at 404-08. One of several exceptions to the
dormant Commerce Clause, the “market participant exception,” simply states that if a state, in
enacting a law or regulation that favors in-state interests or burdens interstate commerce, acts
as a market participant instead of a market regulator then the dormant Commerce Clause does
not apply, and the state may favor its own citizens. Id. at 430. For more information regarding
the scope of the exception, see id. at 430-34.
115. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 59.
116. See id. at 59-60.
117. See id. at 60-61.
118. Id. at 61.
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setts Burma Law or that Massachusetts has First Amendment rights
at stake in the case, Massachusetts asserted “that First Amendment
values should weigh in favor of a finding that Massachusetts has significant interests at stake . . . that should be considered under
Zschernig.”119 The court refused to adopt this view, noting that (1)
“the First Circuit has expressed doubt” that local governments have
First Amendment rights,120 and (2) “[n]othing in Zschernig suggests
that a state government’s First Amendment interests, if any, should
weigh into a consideration of whether a state has impermissibly interfered with the federal government’s foreign affairs power.”121
2. The Foreign Commerce Clause
In a claim not addressed by the district court,122 the “NFTC argue[d] that, regardless of whether the Massachusetts Burma Law
violates the foreign affairs power, the law violates the dormant [Foreign] Commerce Clause.”123 Massachusetts, however, maintained
that (1) the law did not violate the Foreign Commerce Clause, and
(2) even if the Massachusetts Burma Law did violate the Foreign
Commerce Clause, Massachusetts’ status as a market participant
shields the law because the market participant exception defense,
recognized in domestic dormant Commerce Clause case law, should
be extended to apply to the Foreign Commerce Clause.124
Acting as the court of first impression, the First Circuit ruled
against Massachusetts on all of the above issues, thereby invalidating
the Massachusetts Burma Law under the Foreign Commerce
Clause.125 Though the court declined to decide whether the market
participant exception indeed applied to the Foreign Commerce
Clause,126 the court ruled that under domestic dormant Commerce
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 293 (D. Mass.
1998), aff’d, National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999) (declining to decide the Foreign Commerce Clause issue because the argument “[was not] dispositive in this case”).
123. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 62.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 67.
126. See id. at 66. The court abstained from deciding the issue based on the fact that the
Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue. See id.
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Clause analysis, the market participant exception did not protect the
Massachusetts Burma Law because Massachusetts, by enacting the
law, acted as a market regulator rather than a market participant.127
Moreover, the court found that the Massachusetts Burma Law violated the Foreign Commerce Clause because (1) the law “‘facially
discriminates against foreign commerce’”128 while failing to “‘advance[] a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served
by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives,’”129 (2) the law “imped[es] the federal government’s ability to ‘speak with one voice’ in
foreign affairs,”130 and (3) through the law, the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts impermissibly “attempts to regulate conduct beyond
its borders and beyond the borders of this country.”131
3. Federal Preemption of the Massachusetts Burma Law
Moving to the second issue deemed nondispositive by the district
court,132 the First Circuit finally examined the district court’s decision with respect to the NFTC’s claim that federal law preempted
the Massachusetts Burma Law. In doing so, the court first reversed
the district court’s nonbinding observation that “the NFTC ‘failed
to carry [its] burden’ of showing ‘that Congress intended to exercise
its authority to set aside a state law.’”133 According to the First Circuit, this erroneous observation resulted from the district court’s
misapprehension of the NFTC’s burden of proof and resultant application of the wrong legal standard to the facts.134
The First Circuit then proceeded to determine that federal laws
imposing sanctions on Burma preempted the Massachusetts Burma
Law. Massachusetts contended that preemption had not occurred
127. See id. at 62-65.
128. Id. at 66 (quoting Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue and Fin., 505
U.S. 71, 81 (1992)).
129. Id. at 70 (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)).
130. Id. at 68 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 44849 (1979)).
131. Id. at 69.
132. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 293 (1996),
aff’d, National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. granted,
Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999) (declining to
decide whether federal law preempted the Massachusetts Burma Law due to the nondispositive nature of the issue).
133. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 71 (quoting Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 293).
134. See id.
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because (1) Congress had impliedly permitted the Massachusetts
Burma Law by failing to explicitly preempt the law when Congress
knew about the law’s existence135 and (2) even if Congress had not
implicitly permitted the Massachusetts Burma Law, the federal sanction laws had not preempted the Massachusetts Burma Law because
Congress had not clearly manifested its intent that the federal laws
do so.136 The court, however, rejected Massachusetts’ assertions,
finding that (1) Congress did not implicitly approve the Massachusetts Burma Law by failing to explicitly indicate congressional intent
for the federal sanctions to preempt the Massachusetts Burma Law137
and (2) the federal Burma laws preempted the Massachusetts Burma
Law because the federal laws sufficiently filled the foreign affairs field
regarding the imposition of economic sanctions against Burma, and
the Massachusetts Burma Law directly conflicted with the federal
laws’ strategy.138
IV. ANALYSIS
As previously mentioned, the Massachusetts Burma Law marked
a significant development in the evolution of constituent diplomacy.
Not only did the Massachusetts Burma Law prevail as the first state
law of its kind, but, as Part III reveals, the First Circuit’s decision in
National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios raised various constitutional issues of potentially far reaching significance. Such issues include, for example, the constitutionality of state selective purchasing
regulations under the foreign relations effects test established by the
Supreme Court in Zschernig v. Miller,139 the constitutional relationship and boundaries between federalism and United States foreign
relations law,140 the applicability of the First and Tenth Amendments
to foreign relations law,141 the suitability of the market participant
exception of the dormant Commerce Clause to both the foreign

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See id.
See id. at 74.
See id. at 76.
See id. at 76-77.
See supra Part III.B.1.a.
See supra Part III.B.1.a-b.
See supra Part III.B.1.b.
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relations effects test142 and the Foreign Commerce Clause,143 and the
scope of implied federal preemption of state law.144
Despite the potential significance of these and other unspecified
issues, this Part will focus exclusively on the First Circuit’s construction of the relationship and boundaries between federalism and foreign affairs law as determined by the court’s interpretation of the
foreign relations effects test. Specifically, this Part will argue that the
First Circuit’s formulation of the foreign relations effects test is
faulty, not only because it fails to provide a definite standard by
which to measure the constitutionality of constituent diplomacy activities like the Massachusetts Burma Law, but also because it fails to
take into account the manner in which various post–Zschernig international, technological, and constitutional developments have affected the relationship between federalism and foreign affairs. This
Part will then explore several possible formulations of the foreign relations effects test, ultimately arguing that the First Circuit should
have construed the test as an intermediate balancing test similar to
the one proposed by Massachusetts in Natsios.
A. Problems with the First Circuit’s Formulation of the Foreign
Relations Effects Test in National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios
The First Circuit’s construction of the foreign relations effects
test in Natsios suffers from four flaws. First, the court’s formulation
of the test fails to clearly define the test’s criteria and limits, thereby
continuing the imprecision and ambiguity that characterizes the
Zschernig court’s original conception of the test as well as existing jurisprudence regarding subnational involvement in foreign affairs.
Second, the court’s interpretation of the test departs from the
Zschernig court’s focus on application of the subnational regulation
rather than the facial validity of the law. Third, the high level of generality used by the First Circuit in its construction of the test promotes federal exclusivity over foreign affairs at the expense of subnational involvement. Fourth, the First Circuit’s approach fails to take
into account the consequences of significant post–Zschernig developments in federal constitutional law, international relations, and
global interdependence.
142. See supra Part III.B.1.b.
143. See supra Part III.B.2.
144. See supra Part III.B.3.
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1. The court’s failure to clearly define the test
The primary, if not most noticeable, defect of the First Circuit’s
formulation of the foreign relations effects test in Natsios is the
court’s failure to plainly articulate the test’s criteria and standards.
Though the First Circuit’s approach to the effects test parallels that
of the Zschernig court, the absence of definite standards and guidelines undermines the opinion’s precedential value and perpetuates
the ambiguity that has troubled federal courts’ understanding of the
relationship between federalism and foreign affairs since the Supreme
Court’s 1968 decision in Zschernig.
To its credit, the First Circuit did not receive much guidance
from the Zschernig opinion regarding how to frame the foreign relations effects test. As originally presented in Zschernig, the foreign relations effects test consisted of a broad, case-by-case examination of
whether a particular subnational entity’s act impermissibly imposed
on the federal government’s authority over the nation’s foreign affairs.145 Zschernig thus presented the effects test as a factually specific,
general framework with no definite criteria or standards.146
In Natsios, the First Circuit attempted to follow the Zschernig
court’s general, fact-specific approach to the effects test. For example, the First Circuit correctly and clearly stated the effect’s test’s
central question—whether the act in question “‘has more than an
“indirect or incidental effect in foreign countries,”’ and has a ‘“great
potential for disruption or embarrassment”’”147—and conforms with
the Zschernig court’s approach of identifying factual factors that presumably demonstrate the invalidity of the act under the effects
test.148 Also, the First Circuit clearly characterized the effects test’s
underlying “principle that there is a threshold level of involvement in
and impact on foreign affairs which the states may not exceed.”149
Moreover, the court’s application of the test surpasses that of the district court by citing five as opposed to only two factors that, when
145. See supra Part II.D.
146. See id.
147. National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 51 (1st Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999) (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1968)).
148. As previously noted, the only category of factor that appeared in the findings of
both the Natsios and the Zschernig analyses involved the existence of foreign countries’ objections to the law at issue. See supra Part III.B.1.a.
149. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 52.
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combined, indicate that the Massachusetts Burma Law had a direct
effect on foreign relations.150
In the end, however, these measures serve only to restate the foreign relations effects test’s outer framework rather than thoroughly
delineating the framework’s scope or requirements. For example, the
court’s discussion of the “threshold level of [subnational] involvement in and impact on foreign affairs” never identifies the dividing
line separating permissible and impermissible acts.151 Similarly, in its
examination of the various factors that presumably demonstrate the
Massachusetts Burma Law’s impermissible status under the effects
test, the court fails to explain its criteria for selecting such factors and
whether there exist any limits on what type of factors may or may
not be considered in such an analysis.152 Moreover, the court does
not attempt to explain or justify why four of the five factors it identifies to demonstrate the Massachusetts Burma Law’s invalidity differ
in nature from those used by the Zschernig court.153
The First Circuit’s formulation of the foreign relations effects test
thus does little more than restate the test’s outer framework and underlying principles, leaving undefined the framework’s definite scope
and requirements. To be sure, the First Circuit is not alone it its failure to clearly define the effects test’s parameters and minimum standards; the same flaw can be found in both the Supreme Court’s
original formulation of the test in Zschernig 154 and the Massachusetts

150. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (listing five factors identified by the First
Circuit as evidence of the Massachusetts Burma Law’s direct effect on foreign relations); National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 291 (1998) (identifying two factors that caused the Massachusetts Burma Law to impermissibly impinge on federal power over
foreign affairs: the law’s purpose of furthering democratic reforms in Burma and the fact that
the European Union, Japan, and the Association of the South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
had formally informed the World Trade Organization and the United States government of
their opposition to the law).
151. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 52-53.
152. See id. at 53-54.
153. See id. at 53. As previously noted, the only factor common to the analyses of both
the Natsios and the Zschernig courts involved the existence of foreign countries’ objections to
the law at issue. See supra Part III.B.1.a.
154. See supra Part II.D. Somewhat ironically, the First Circuit noted the flaws with the
Supreme Court’s formulation of the effects test when it observed that “[t]he precise boundaries of the Supreme Court’s [articulation of the effects test] in Zschernig are unclear.” Natsios,
181 F.3d at 51-52 (footnote omitted).
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district court’s subsequent interpretation of the test in the trial court
proceedings of Natsios.155
The absence of such definite boundaries and standards undermines the First Circuit’s holding regarding the invalidity of the Massachusetts Burma Law in two primary ways. First, due to the lack of
definite criteria and standards, the court’s holding appears to be extremely fact-specific, if not based on the court’s opinion rather than
established legal principles. Such flaws undermine the opinion’s precedential value by limiting its applicability to a situation with similar
factual circumstances and rendering suspect the legitimacy of the
court’s reasoning.
More importantly, the decision’s lack of clearly defined requirements preserves the ambiguity and vagueness of the relationship between federalism and foreign affairs that has plagued federal jurisprudence since the Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in Zschernig.156
Consequently, the decision perpetuates the very real risk of inconsistent judicial conclusions regarding which state actions unlawfully encroach on the federal government’s foreign affairs power. Therefore,
if nothing else, the First Circuit’s failure in Natsios to clearly define
the criteria and standards applicable to the foreign relations effects
test renders the court’s decision another “missed . . . opportunity to
clarify current jurisprudence regarding state involvement in foreign
affairs.”157
2. The court’s departure from Zschernig’s application-oriented focus
Another significant flaw in the First Circuit’s formulation of the
foreign relations effects test involves the court’s departure from the
Zschernig court’s focus on the validity of the application of a subnational act rather than the act’s facial validity. As two commentators
recently observed, “[o]ne fact about Zschernig that is often overlooked is that the Court only held the Oregon law unconstitutional
as applied,”158 and they distinguished the case from the Court’s previous decision, Clark v. Allen,159 where the Court had upheld a simi-

155. See supra note 18.
156. For a brief discussion of the ambiguity in federal jurisprudence regarding the relationship between federalism and foreign affairs, see supra Part II.D.
157. Recent Cases, supra note 18, at 2014.
158. Loschin & Anderson, supra note 20, at 403.
159. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
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lar California statute against a challenge to the statute’s facial validity.160 The Court’s construction of the foreign relations effects test in
Zschernig, therefore, focused on the application of the Oregon law
rather than the law’s facial validity. Indeed, Justice Douglas’s opinion, “full of quotations from previous lower court rulings, seemed
highly critical of probate judges who were willing to summarily discriminate against Soviet client states. It was not the state’s laws that
were unconstitutional, but the way judges discriminatorily applied
them that created the potential international embarrassment.”161
A close examination of the First Circuit’s construction and discussion of the foreign relations effects test in Natsios reveals that the
court deviated from Justice Douglas’ focus on state officials’ application of the state law at issue and focused instead on the facial validity
of the law itself. As previously mentioned, the five factors cited by
the court as evidence of the Massachusetts Burma Law’s direct effect
on foreign affairs include (1) the law’s purpose to affect another
country’s affairs, (2) the fact that Massachusetts’ economic power
positioned the state so that the law could and has had an effect, (3)
the possibility that the law’s effects could be amplified if other subnational entities enacted similar regulations, (4) the fact that several
foreign countries and regional organizations had protested the law,
and (5) the fact that the law deviated from the federal Burma law in
several ways.162 Conspicuously absent from the court’s list are any
factors that approximate Judge Douglas’s concerns in Zschernig that
state judges or (under a broader reading of Zschernig) other state officials may have applied the Massachusetts Burma Law in a discriminatory fashion. Instead, the list appears to emphasize purely facial
concerns, such as the law’s purpose or motive, as well as its deviation
from the federal Burma law.
The First Circuit’s facially-oriented formulation of the foreign relations effects test in Natsios thus remains inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s application-oriented focus in Zschernig. Under an application-oriented effects test, the First Circuit arguably could have
held the law unconstitutional if it had found that state officials, in
fulfilling their duties to enforce the law or maintain the restricted
purchasing list, had made “ad hoc decisions about foreign govern-

160. See supra Part II.D.
161. Loschin & Anderson, supra note 20, at 404 (footnotes omitted).
162. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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ments’ policies and credibility.”163 Regardless of how the court might
have viewed the Massachusetts Burma Law under such an application-oriented construction of the effects test, the fact remains that
the court’s formulation of the test in Natsios departs from the test’s
original formulation in Zschernig.
3. The court’s formulation of the test at a high level of generality
A third notable defect in the First Circuit’s formulation of the
foreign relations effects test concerns the court’s construction of the
test at a high level of generality that effectively bars any substantive
involvement by subnational actors in foreign affairs. As one commentator recently observed, federal jurisprudence regarding the validity
of acts of constituent diplomacy under Zschernig can be divided into
“two different and inconsistent approaches for applying the [foreign
relations] effects test: formulating the effects inquiry at either a high
or low level of generality.”164 Significantly,
[i]nquiries at a high level of generality examine any potential effects
that the statute could have on U.S. foreign relations. The mere intention of a state to affect a foreign country’s domestic policies,
when examined from a high level of generality, would be seen as
potentially affecting foreign affairs because of the possibility that a
foreign country could react to a state’s commentary. Alternatively,
when framing the effects question at a low level of generality,
courts focus on the actual effects a statute has on a foreign country.165

“The level of generality that the court applies to [the foreign relations] effects inquiry is particularly important because”166 it effectively determines the validity of a statute: to date, those courts that
have employed the effects test “at a high level of generality . . . have
consequently found the state action in question invalid.”167

163. Loschin & Anderson, supra note 20, at 405 (citation omitted). Loschin and Anderson argue that Zschernig’s application-oriented focus on ad hoc decision making by subnational
officials “does not apply to selective purchasing laws” because “[t]he legislature . . . makes a
single decision that [the state] will not do business with certain companies” rather than “the
same type of continuous credibility decisions” deemed impermissible in Zschernig. Id.
164. Recent Cases, supra note 18, at 2016.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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Conversely, those that have applied a low level of generality have
found the subnational actor’s conduct to be constitutional.168
In Natsios, the First Circuit followed the approach favored by the
majority of the courts that have examined the validity of a subnational actor’s actions under Zschernig and framed its formulation of
the foreign relations effects test at a high level of generality. 169
Rather than investigating the effects that the Massachusetts Burma
Law had generated within Burma, the court focused its inquiry on
the potential effects that the law could have on United States foreign
relations. Consequently, the court focused on such factual factors as
the law’s purpose to affect Burma’s internal affairs and the manner in
which Massachusetts’ economic power positioned the state so that
the law could exert an effect on Burma.170
Two principal problems stem from the First Circuit’s formulation
of the foreign relations effects test at a high level of generality. First,
as presently framed, the test essentially guarantees that virtually no
subnational actions will be deemed valid under Zschernig. As one
commentator observed, “framing the Zschernig effects inquiry at a
high level of generality makes it nearly impossible to find that the act
does not affect foreign relations.”171 Though the effects test itself
states that subnational actors should be allowed some level of involvement in foreign affairs, the fact that a test framed at a high level
of generality permits courts to focus on factors not pertaining to the
actual repercussions of a subnational entity’s acts within the target
state makes it extremely likely, if not impossible, for the court to uphold subnational acts. Though such a result is arguably “normatively
better” because it protects the federal government’s authority over
foreign affairs from harmful subnational encroachment,172 it also prevents subnational actors from participating in foreign affairs in an era
when globalization has intermingled local interests and international
issues in an unprecedented manner.173

168. See id. at 2017-18.
169. See id. at 2016-17 (demonstrating that most cases that have applied the foreign relations effects test at a high level of generality have declared the subnational actor’s conduct to
be invalid).
170. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
171. Recent Cases, supra note 18, at 2018.
172. See id.
173. For a more in-depth discussion of globalization and subnational involvement in foreign affairs issues, see infra Part IV.A.4.c.
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More importantly, any formulation of the foreign relations effects test at a high degree of generality potentially threatens the
validity of subnational actions normally considered to be distinct
from foreign affairs. As constitutional scholar Louis Henkin recently
observed, such a formulation of the effects test “might cast doubts
on the right of the states to apply their own ‘public policy’ in
transnational situations.”174 Moreover, “[i]t would presumably
condemn also ‘sense resolutions’ on foreign policy by state
legislatures though such resolutions are not law and could not be
invalidated, and state legislatures presumably cannot be prevented or
enjoined from adopting them.”175
Thus, the First Circuit’s construction of the foreign relations effects test at a high level of generality is flawed for two principal reasons. First, it essentially precludes subnational involvement in foreign
affairs. Second, it threatens the validity of subnational activities traditionally deemed outside the scope of foreign affairs and “intended
primarily to raise public consciousness, stimulate public discussion,
and persuade or influence the federal government to consider or reexamine particular policies.”176
4. The court’s failure to account for post–Zschernig developments in
U.S. constitutional law, geopolitical relations, and global
interdependence
A final defect in the First Circuit’s construction of the foreign relations effects test involves the court’s failure to formulate the test in
accordance with post–Zschernig developments regarding federal constitutional law, geopolitical relations, and global interdependence. As
the discussion below demonstrates, despite the fact that these factors
did not formally figure into the Supreme Court’s formulation or
analysis of the foreign relations effects test in Zschernig, the principle
of absolute federal exclusivity over foreign affairs that underlies both
the Court’s holding and its construction of the effects test cannot be
fully or accurately understood without them.
More importantly, however, the manner in which these factors
have developed and changed since the Court decided Zschernig in
174. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 164
(2d ed. 1996).
175. Id. at 164 n.∗.
176. Id. (endnote omitted).
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1968 has great significance for the way Zschernig and the foreign relations effects test should be understood and applied today. Specifically, the changes that have occurred during the past thirty years in
federalism’s importance in U.S. constitutional law, the development
of geopolitical relations, and the increase in global interdependence
indicate that absolute federal exclusivity over foreign affairs is no
longer warranted, meaning that subnational actors should be permitted increased involvement in foreign affairs. Zschernig and the effects
test thus should be construed in a way that provides an increased role
for subnational interests and allows constituent diplomacy greater
participation in the international arena.
The First Circuit’s formulation of the foreign relations effects test
in Natsios is therefore flawed because it continues Zschernig’s narrow
focus on maintaining absolute federal exclusivity over foreign affairs
and fails to allow subnational actors greater participation in foreign
affairs. Consequently, the First Circuit’s approach remains based on
outdated, if not illegitimate, ideological underpinnings.
a. The importance of federalism in U.S. constitutional law. Since
the early twentieth century, U.S. jurisprudence regarding foreign affairs has maintained the general principle that “[p]ower over external
affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively.”177 Under this view (which carries such labels as
the “exclusivity principle”178 or the “twentieth-century view”179),
“the reserved powers of the states do not limit the federal government’s exercise of foreign affairs powers, and states are broadly prohibited from engaging in foreign affairs activities.”180 According to
the exclusivity principle’s proponents, the virtual exclusion of subna177. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942); see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (“Our system of government is such that the interest of the cities, counties
and states, no less than the interest of the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires
that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference.”); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (“[I]n respect of our foreign
relations generally, state lines disappear.”).
178. Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1224
(1999).
179. Bradley, supra note 62, at 1093. Bradley recognizes federal exclusivity over foreign
affairs as only one of three elements making up “the twentieth century view” of United States
foreign affairs. The other two components include the supremacy of the executive branch in
foreign relations matters, see id. at 1091, and “the notion that federal courts should make law
when necessary to protect the national government’s prerogatives in foreign affairs,” id. at
1095.
180. Id. at 1093.
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tional actors from the international relations arena is justifiable, if not
necessary, because “foreign affairs concern the interests of the entire
nation and thus are not the province of the constituent states,”181
and, “[w]ithout constraints on state power, . . . one state will take
action for which other states or the whole nation will suffer the adverse consequences.”182 Federalism and states rights concerns are
therefore irrelevant due to the prevailing need for the country to
“speak with one voice.”183
Scholar Peter J. Spiro recently observed that the Supreme
Court’s decision and creation of the foreign relations effects test in
Zschernig coincided with, and possibly contributed to, “the high
mark of federal exclusivity.”184 As previously discussed, the Zschernig
court’s construction of the effects test focused on the Oregon law’s
potential for “direct[ly] impact[ing] . . . foreign relations and . . . adversely affect[ing] the power of the central government to deal with
those problems”185 rather than the law’s actual effects within East
Germany.186 Thus formulated at a high level of generality, the
Zschernig construction of the effects test established the absolute
character of federal exclusivity by virtually guaranteeing that any
subnational act would be struck down as violating the federal government’s authority over foreign affairs.187 Moreover, in framing the
test, the Court justified federal exclusivity by assuming that the Constitution’s allocation of “certain specific powers regarding foreign affairs to Congress and to the President implies a general federal foreign affairs power that is both penumbral (i.e., broader and less
determinate than the specific foreign affairs power delegated to the
federal government [by the Constitution]), and dormant (i.e., preclusive of inconsistent state legislation).”188 The Zschernig court’s
construction of the foreign relations effects test thus established absolute federal exclusivity over foreign affairs, “effectively

181. Id.
182. Spiro, supra note 178, at 1225 (footnote omitted).
183. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976); see also Japan Line, Ltd.
v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979).
184. Spiro, supra note 178, at 1241.
185. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968).
186. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
187. See Porterfield, supra note 5, at 10.
188. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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abandon[ing] the view that our system of federalism imposes certain
limits on the federal government’s authority over the states.”189
In recent years, the continued legitimacy of absolute federal exclusivity in contemporary United States foreign affairs law has been
indirectly brought into question by the Supreme Court’s “revival of
federalism restrictions”190 on federal government authority. During
“the past decade, the Supreme Court has shown a willingness to impose federalism restrictions on the national government, both in the
form of limitations on the scope of the federal government’s delegated powers and in the form of independent sovereignty restraints
on the exercise of these powers.”191 For example, in United States v.
Lopez,192 the Court struck down a national law prohibiting the possession of firearms in school zones, holding that the law exceeded
congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce under the
Commerce Clause.193 In support of its decision, the Court emphasized the importance of not interpreting the enumerated powers
granted by the Constitution to the federal government so broadly as
to destroy the “healthy balance of power between the States and
Federal Government.”194 Though the Constitution granted Congress
the authority to regulate interstate commerce, the Court noted that
the need to protect state control over education from congressional
intrusion required that Congress’s authority be interpreted narrowly
so as to not intrude on state sovereignty.195 Federalism’s interest in
preserving state authority and sovereignty thus required that federal
authority be construed in a restricted manner.
Though Lopez and the Court’s other federalism-related decisions196 have occurred primarily in the domestic context, Professor
189. Id. at 2 (footnote omitted).
190. Bradley, supra note 62, at 1100-01 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)).
191. Id. at 1100.
192. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
193. See id. at 567-68.
194. Id. at 552 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
195. See id. at 566.
196. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating, under the
Tenth Amendment, a federal law directing state and local executive officials to assist in implementing a federal gun control scheme involving background checks of gun purchasers); Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (holding in part that Congress,
not the courts, possesses the authority to determine whether state autonomy or tax uniformity
best serves the national interest); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking
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Curtis A. Bradley noted that the Court’s recent decision in Breard v.
Greene 197 constitutes a “sign that this revival of federalism restrictions will indeed spill over to foreign affairs.”198 In Breard, the Court
declined to grant a stay of execution to a Paraguayan citizen executed by the Commonwealth of Virginia in 1998.199 The Court justified its decision on federalism grounds, affirming that the “prerogative” of whether or not to stay the execution belonged to the state
governor, not the Court.200 It should be noted that the Court maintained its profederalism rationale despite the fact that Virginia officials’ conduct in arresting Breard violated the requirements of an international treaty to which the United States is a party, and the
International Court of Justice had issued an order requiring the U.S.
government to delay the execution.201
So what does the Court’s newfound affinity for federalism mean
for absolute federal exclusivity in general and the First Circuit’s approach to the foreign relations effects test in particular? First, it indicates that the principle of absolute federal exclusivity over foreign affairs no longer applies to United States foreign relations law. To be
sure, “[t]he persistent potential for subfederal action to disrupt national foreign relations”202 still maintains the necessity for federal supremacy over foreign relations. Supremacy, however, is not the same
as exclusivity and can be construed so as to allow subnational entities
greater access to, and participation in, the foreign affairs arena. As
Professor Harold G. Maier asserted,
The principle of federalism echoes a fundamental principle of democracy: that governmental decisions made at the local level are
more likely to reflect the will of the people most directly affected by
them. As long as the United States continues to exist as a federal
nation, decisions in cases involving possible state intrusion into foreign affairs must continue to strike an appropriate balance between

down, under the Tenth Amendment, a federal law requiring states to regulate low level radioactive waste in a manner specified by Congress).
197. 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
198. Bradley, supra note 62, at 1101.
199. 523 U.S. at 378-79.
200. See id.
201. See Bradley, supra note 62, at 1101.
202. Spiro, supra note 178, at 1247.
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preservation of the values of local self-government and the need for
national uniformity in matters of international affairs.203

Federalism, therefore, requires that the principle of federal exclusivity
be replaced by a more moderate principle of federal supremacy (or
“limited federal exclusivity”) that allows the federal government to
have the final say in foreign affairs while simultaneously providing
subnational entities broader involvement.
Second, given the illegitimacy of federal exclusivity under federalism, the Supreme Court’s recent revival of federalism means that
the First Circuit’s formulation of the foreign relations effects test in
Natsios must be considered defective to the degree it perpetuates
federal exclusivity and unduly prohibits subnational involvement in
foreign affairs. A careful examination of the First Circuit’s formulation of the test indicates that the test fails under this rationale. As
previously demonstrated, the First Circuit’s construction of the test
at a high level of generality vigorously and effectively promotes federal exclusivity by prohibiting virtually all subnational participation in
foreign affairs.204 The First Circuit’s construction of the foreign relations effects test in Natsios, therefore, is flawed because its vigorous
promotion of federal exclusivity over foreign affairs fails to account
for the Supreme Court’s recent revival of federalism as a limit on
federal authority.
b. Geopolitical relations and the end of the Cold War. In general,
scholars and commentators agree that both the Supreme Court’s decision in Zschernig and its formulation of the foreign relations effects
test should be understood as “a judicial reaction to a state’s contributions to the Cold War.”205 According to this view, the highly polarized international climate and very real potential for retaliation
that accompanied the U.S.-Soviet geopolitical rivalry necessitated the
203. Maier, supra note 82, at 837.
204. See supra Part IV.A.3.
205. HENKIN, supra note 174, at 165. See also Goldsmith, supra note 79, at 1408-09
(asserting that the Court’s establishment of the foreign relations effects test during the Cold
War made sense due in part to the flexibility and control that the test offered to the judiciary);
Spiro, supra note 178, at 1242 (“[Zschernig] seems both explained and justified (at least at the
time) by its Cold War context.”); Carvajal, supra note 20, at 268 (asserting that “[b]ecause . . .
Zschernig [was] decided in the midst of . . . the Cold War, . . . the Court was concerned primarily with the international consequences of angering a foreign nation”). But see Denning &
McCall, supra note 20, at 323 n.83 (labeling the statement that Zschernig “should be read
against, and limited by, a Cold War backdrop” as “a non sequitur” and arguing that
“[c]oncerns with state conduct of foreign policy predated the Cold War”).
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extreme variety of federal exclusivity over United States foreign affairs promoted by the Court’s formulation of the foreign relations
effects test in Zschernig.206 As Professor Spiro observed,
In the tinderbox world of superpower competition, the potential
consequences of giving offense were obviously profound. One
could not expect the Soviets necessarily to understand that when a
state official spoke, it was not for the nation; or at least one would
not want to risk error in assessing that perception. At the very least,
there was the specter of state action upsetting the elaborately choreographed relationship between East and West Blocs; at worst,
one could plausibly draw a scenario in which offense caused by
state action lit the fuse to World War III. Nor against this backdrop
could one rely on the political branches to beat back state action
before the damage was done; the context, in other words, supported the strict application of a dormant federal power.207

The Cold War period thus “represented a justifiable zenith for the
exclusivity” of federal power over foreign affairs.208
Against this background that emphasized the need for federal exclusivity over foreign affairs, “[t]he rise of the foreign relations effects test . . . ma[de] sense.”209 As articulated by the Court in Zschernig, the effects test sought to protect against “the dangers which are
involved if each State . . . is permitted to establish its own foreign
policy”210 by establishing the superiority of federal control over foreign affairs in all instances where state action could arguably affect
the nation’s foreign relations in a direct manner.211 According to
Professor Jack L. Goldsmith, the effects test’s case-by-case approach
likely appealed to the Court due to the fact that “any errors of under- or overinclusiveness [that might have resulted from a rule-like
approach] were thought to be unacceptably costly in the Cold War
world.”212 Moreover, the “effects test might have seemed to allow
the Court more flexibility in avoiding costly foreign relations errors

206. See Spiro, supra note 178, at 1227-28. For a brief discussion on federal exclusivity
and the Zschernig court’s construction of the foreign relations effects test, see id. at 1231-32.
207. Spiro, supra note 178, at 1242 (footnotes omitted).
208. Id. at 1228.
209. Goldsmith, supra note 79, at 1409.
210. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968).
211. See id.
212. Goldsmith, supra note 79, at 1409.
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and in shaping its judgments to the wishes of the Executive in crisis.”213
Regardless of the precise reasons why the Court adopted the foreign relations effects test in Zschernig, the need for strict federal exclusivity ended with the conclusion of the Cold War in the early
1990s. Simply put, the end of the Cold War thus signaled “a reduced need for the national government to speak with one voice in
international relations.”214 As Professor Goldsmith observed,
It was plausible to think in 1964—less than two years after the Cuban missile crisis—that the adjudication of a Cuban expropriation
of American property might produce a foreign relations crisis that
literally threatened the nation’s existence. It is easy to understand a
similar reaction to Oregon’s retaliatory legislation against East Germany in 1968. When formally analogous situations arise in our
post–Cold War world—for example, when a court adjudicates the
validity of a Russian act of state, or when Massachusetts sanctions
[Burma] for human rights violations—the consequences for U.S.
foreign relations and for the survival of the nation cannot be compared to the Cold War period. They are from any perspective much
less significant.215

The conclusion of the Cold War thus discontinued the need for federal exclusivity over foreign affairs. 216 Moreover, without a need for
federal exclusivity, the end of the Cold War indicated the demise of
Zschernig and its broad formulation of the foreign relations effects
test, leading one scholar to surmise that “[o]ne would be bold to
predict that [Zschernig] has a future life; might it remain on the Supreme Court’s pages, a relic of the Cold War?”217
Thus, any broad, Zschernig-like post–Cold War formulation of
the foreign relations effects test must be considered defective to the
degree it promotes federal exclusivity. Under this reasoning, the First
Circuit’s construction of the effects test in Natsios once again should
be considered flawed because its high level of generality effectively

213. Id. (footnote omitted).
214. Bradley, supra note 62, at 1105.
215. Goldsmith, supra note 79, at 1412 (footnotes omitted).
216. See Spiro, supra note 178, at 1247 (“[P]erhaps the best argument for softening the
rule of federal exclusivity highlights the end of the Cold War and the diminished ultimate dangers of foreign retaliation.”).
217. HENKIN, supra note 174, at 165 n.∗∗.
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promotes federal exclusivity by prohibiting virtually all subnational
participation in foreign affairs.218
c. The growth of global interdependence. Since early twentieth century, the principle of federal exclusivity over foreign affairs has
“rested on the proposition that . . . the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ affairs of the United States were essentially different.”219 As G. Edward
White observed, Americans have perceived the relatively peaceful
state of domestic politics to be fundamentally different from the
unstable world of international geopolitics whose sovereign actors
[have] seemed to behave in incomprehensible but threatening
ways. Policymaking in that realm [has] seemed to bear little relationship to policymaking in the still peaceful, democratic, capitalist
American domestic arena. As such, foreign relations policymaking
[has] appeared to be a natural province of specialists who [can] respond to internationally generated threats to American security
with swift and flexible diplomatic or military actions.220

Federal exclusivity, therefore, has resulted from the perception that
the federal government, rather than any state or subnational actor,
possesses the knowledge, skill, and capacity to properly confront and
deal with the “alien, delicate, and dangerous” international arena.221
Notably, the manner in which global interdependence has
evolved and grown in the decades since the Supreme Court decided
Zschernig has greatly undermined, if not abolished, the validity of
these arguments in support of federal exclusivity. Specifically, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs has eroded in an unprecedented fashion in recent years due to three general developments. First, there no longer exists a “rigid separation between
foreign and domestic affairs”;222 rather, they have become intertwined into “‘intermestic’ affairs.”223 For example, issues such as
“trade, investment, tourism, immigration, drug trafficking, . . . corporate chartering, crime control, public health and welfare, land use,
labor relations, and the regulation of banking, insurance, telecom218. See supra Part IV.A.3.
219. G. Edward White, Observations on the Turning of Foreign Affairs Jurisprudence, 70
U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1114 (1999) (citing GEORGE SUTHERLAND, THE INTERNAL AND
EXTERNAL POWERS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, S. DOC. NO. 61-417 (2d Sess. 1909)).
220. Id. at 1121.
221. Id. at 1122.
222. Kincaid, supra note 21, at 121.
223. Id. (citation omitted).
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munications, professional activity, wildlife, and the environment”224
all have become significant domestically as well as internationally.
Moreover, traditionally “foreign” and “domestic” areas of law have
become “domesticized” (or “internationalized,” depending on one’s
point of view) as “the scope of international law has broadened substantially, both covering many areas that were formerly regulated
only by domestic law and governing the rights and duties not only of
nation-states, but also of individuals.”225
Second, in addition to participating in many “international” activities that require little or no experience or expertise, 226 subnational
actors have become increasingly more familiar with international issues and foreign practices as they have participated in the international arena. Most subnational entities “have experienced the new
interdependence quite directly, and it reaches into virtually every sector of [subnational] life.”227 In addition, as subnational entities have
dealt with similar foreign entities, they have opened new “channels
of contact across national boundaries,” thereby facilitating a new and
deeper “understanding of the internal allocation of authorities in
other nations.”228
Third, subnational entities and their constituencies (the infamous
“public”) have become better equipped to participate in traditionally
“international” matters as technological advances have made relevant
information increasingly more timely, more accessible, and less costly
to obtain. As one commentator affirmed,
From the technological advances in communications alone, Americans have access to massive amounts of timely information, and indeed can monitor diplomatic events visually. While the public may,
with good reason, be denied access to certain data because of its
sensitivity, the willing citizen or group can become sufficiently
versed in matters that are or should be unclassified to make

224. Id.
225. Bradley, supra note 62, at 1105 (footnote omitted).
226. See Bilder, supra note 57, at 123 (“[T]he kinds of international matters and issues
with which state and local governments are concerned do not require special expertise or information. One does not have to be a foreign relations expert to have a sister city, promote
trade in local products or reach sensible opinions on the need for arms control or the undesirability of apartheid.”).
227. Kincaid, supra note 21, at 122.
228. Spiro, supra note 178, at 1224.
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educated judgments about the basic substance of most foreign affairs problems.229

Made in 1976, only eight years after the Court’s decision in Zschernig, these statements have become much more pertinent thanks to
recent communications-related technological developments involving computers, the Internet, more sophisticated communications
satellites, and other similar technology. Due to such developments in
communications technology, the “metaphor of the global village, a
place where incidental, even random international contacts are routine” has become reality for many, if not most Americans.230
Together, these three factors indicate that the traditional “external/internal” rationale supporting federal exclusivity over federal affairs no longer applies to United States foreign affairs law and that,
by extension, federal exclusivity ranks as an illegitimate objective.
Also, these factors strongly suggest that constituent diplomacy efforts should be permitted greater involvement in the international
arena because subnational groups now possess the experience, contacts, and information to make proper decisions and act responsibly.
Admittedly, this does not mean that states should be granted free
reign; as previously mentioned, there still exists some need for national uniformity in foreign affairs. Nevertheless, these factors indicate that any doctrine that supports federal exclusivity and severely
limits subnational participation in foreign affairs, such as the First
Circuit’s construction of the foreign relations affairs test, should be
considered outdated or even invalid.
d. Summary and conclusion. The final flaw in the First Circuit’s
formulation of the foreign relations effects test in Natsios concerns
the court’s failure to adequately account for post–Zschernig developments in U.S. constitutional law, geopolitical relations, and global
interdependence, and their effect on the legitimacy of the federal exclusivity principle. Both individually and collectively, the Supreme
Court’s recent commitment to federalism, the end of the Cold War,
and the ever-increasing phenomenon of global interdependence sup229. Richard A. Frank, Public Participation in the Foreign Policy Process, in THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY: AN INQUIRY BY A PANEL OF THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 66, 71 (Francis O. Wilcox & Richard A. Frank
eds., 1976). Frank suggested increased public involvement through such means as administrative proceedings, advisory committees and delegations, and public congressional hearings
rather than constituent diplomacy. See id. at 74-81.
230. White, supra note 219, at 1122-23.
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port the proposition that federal exclusivity over foreign affairs is no
longer a desirable or legitimate principle. Accordingly, these factors
indicate that Zschernig and its foreign relations effects test should be
construed narrowly to prevent federal exclusivity while providing an
increased role for subnational interests and allowing constituent diplomacy greater participation in the international arena. Unfortunately for the First Circuit, its formulation of the effects test in
Natsios must be considered defective under the above rationale because the test employs a high level of generality that promotes federal exclusivity and severely restricts subnational involvement in foreign affairs, and it fails to account for the pro-constituent diplomacy
principles established by the post–Zschernig developments discussed
above.
B. Options on Review: Proposed Approaches and the Appeal of a
Limited Balancing Test
Given the First Circuit’s flawed formulation of the foreign relations effects test in National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, what
approach should the courts adopt in the future to achieve a permissible construction of the test? Admittedly, the question of how the effects test should be framed is not easily answered and has been the
subject of much scholarly commentary and debate ever since the Supreme Court first ambiguously articulated the test in Zschernig v.
Miller.231 However, a close review of the lessons derived from the
First Circuit’s defective approach in Natsios and the strengths and
weaknesses of several potential approaches suggests that the most
suitable construction of the effects inquiry would be a limited balancing test similar to the three-part analysis suggested by Harold G.
Maier.

231. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA.
L. REV. 1617, 1699-711 (1997) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of categorical
rules, executive suggestion, and motive review, and concluding that the foreign relations effects
test should be abandoned); HENKIN, supra note 174, at 164 (listing different possible approaches to, and formulations of, the effects test); Maier, supra, note 82, at 838-39 (suggesting a three-part analysis based on the considerations addressed by Zschernig and related cases);
Weisburd, supra note 67, at 59-60 (proposing a three-factor, categorically-oriented test).
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1. Lessons from Natsios
As an example of a defective construction of the foreign relations
effects test, the First Circuit’s formulation of the test in Natsios illustrates several requirements that any construction of the test must follow. First, a proposed formulation of the test should clearly set forth
the test’s requirements and scope, not just its outer framework.232 In
other words, the test needs to distinctly explain the threshold separating permissible and impermissible subnational acts, identify its
minimum standards, and define the criteria that will be considered in
its analysis. As previously demonstrated, failure to take such steps affects the apparent legitimacy of a court’s holding by both making the
court’s test appear to be based on opinion rather than established legal principles and perpetuating the real risk of inconsistent judicial
conclusions regarding the types of subnational actions that should be
considered permissible.233
Second, a proposed test should focus on the validity of the application of a subnational act rather than the act’s facial validity.234 A facial inquiry remains inconsistent with the application-oriented approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Zschernig.
Third, a proposed formulation of the test should not be framed
at a high degree of generality.235 Again, this simply means that a test
should analyze the actual effects of the subnational action in question within a particular country rather than the potential effects that
the law could have on United States foreign relations.
Finally, a proposed construction of the test should not directly or
indirectly promote federal exclusivity over foreign affairs.236 Such a
result or objective remains clearly inconsistent with post–Zschernig
developments in U.S. constitutional law, global geopolitical relations, and global interdependence.237
In conclusion, it should be remembered that any proposed formulation of the foreign relations effects test must satisfy all of the
above requirements. Failure to fulfill any of them will render the

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

See supra Part IV.A.1.
Id.
See supra Part IV.A.2.
See supra Part IV.A.3.
See supra Part IV.A.4.a-d.
See id.
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proposed approach to the test markedly less effective, if not defective.
2. Strengths and weaknesses of proposed approaches
As previously mentioned, scholars and commentators have suggested numerous possible constructions of the foreign relations effects test. Examples of proposed approaches include framing the test
as categorical rules,238 allowing the executive branch to prescribe
which subnational activities should be considered impermissible,239
asking whether a subnational action requires a subnational actor to
“sit in judgment” on a foreign government’s policies or practices,240
examining the motive of a subnational activity to determine whether
it intends to affect a foreign government’s domestic agenda,241 and
balancing federal and subnational interests to determine whether a
particular subnational activity discriminates against or unduly burdens the federal government’s conduct of foreign relations.242
Though most of these suggested approaches provide a readily
workable formula, a brief examination of them reveals that all are unacceptable due to their failure to satisfy the Natsios requirements or
some other internal defect or inconsistency.
a. Categorical rules. One relatively common proposed approach
to the foreign relations effects test involves framing the test as rules
that categorically define what types of subnational actions constitute
permissible acts with indirect effects. One commentator, for example, suggested that subnational actions be considered to have direct
effects on foreign affairs (and therefore to be impermissible) “in only
three types of cases”: (1) when the subnational action involves “any
matter that requires a prior decision about what counts as a foreign
state,”243 (2) when the subnational action subjects “a foreign state’s
public policy . . . to formal judicial evaluation,”244 and (3) when the
subnational action involves “immigration matters.”245 This approach,

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
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See infra Part IV.B.2.a.
See infra Part IV.B.2.b.
See infra Part IV.B.2.c.
See infra Part IV.B.2.d.
See infra Part IV.B.2.e.
Weisburd, supra note 67, at 59.
Id.
Id.
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he argued, “makes sense as a matter of principle”246 because it gives
subnational entities authority over categories that “fail to implicate a
federal interest”247 while preserving federal authority over more sensitive and problematic issues.248
In an era when there exists pressure for the courts to draw bright
lines around acceptable and unacceptable conduct, the proposal to
frame the effects test as categorical rules has great appeal. Not only
would categorical rules be justiciably manageable, they would also
present subnational entities and their respective constituencies with
advance knowledge of the varieties of diplomatic activities in which
they may participate. Furthermore, a categorical approach would be
able “to make wider, and hopefully more informed, predictions
about the aims of the political branches” than does case-by-case
analysis under a broader standard.249
Unfortunately, the benefits that might accrue from a categorical
approach do not outweigh “the fundamental problem of deciding
which narrowly defined categories warrant judicial preemption.”250
The process of determining which actions should be classified in
which category remains open to various criticisms and problems:
“the uncertain need for such law, [the] courts’ relative incompetence
to choose the appropriate category of preemption and the content of
this law, [the] asymmetry in political branch incentives to revise judicial errors,” to name a few.251 Also, categories “are bound to be
over- and underinclusive with respect to the purposes of the foreign
relations doctrines.”252 Moreover, “as the scope of [constituent diplomacy activities] expands to include nontraditional [subnational]
foreign relations activities that require more fine-grained contextual
assessments, a rule-based approach will be much harder to craft, and
error costs of any such rule will likely be significant.”253
Thus, despite a categorical approach’s appeal and potential benefits as a method of creating bright-line rules, it must be deemed an

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 60.
Goldsmith, supra note 79, at 1431.
Goldsmith, supra note 231, at 1706 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Goldsmith, supra note 79, at 1431.
Goldsmith, supra note 231, at 1708.
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unacceptable formulation of the foreign relations effects test due to
its internal flaws and difficulties.
b. Executive suggestion. Another proposed approach to formulating the foreign relations effects test entails treating all subnational activities that violate boundaries suggested by the executive branch as
having a direct effect on foreign affairs.254 According to this approach, the executive branch should be permitted to officially prescribe to the courts what types of subnational actions ought to be
prohibited.255 The executive branch’s recommendation, therefore,
“would constitute case-specific federal law binding on courts.”256
On one hand, the “executive suggestion”257 approach appears to
offer a more professional approach to defining the line between impermissible and permissible subnational involvement in foreign affairs. Unlike the judicial branch, the executive possesses “the expertise, the democratic accountability, and the centralized decisionmaking capabilities”258 to formulate effective and proper boundaries
for subnational actors’ participation in the international arena.
On the other hand, the executive suggestion approach contains
several fatal flaws. For example, the executive branch lacks the constitutional authority to engage in this sort of lawmaking, and it seems
unlikely that Congress would delegate such authority.259 Similarly,
“case-specific federal lawmaking without notice, opportunity to be
heard, or appellate review does violence to basic notions of due
process.”260 Finally, granting the executive branch the authority and
responsibility to determine the scope of permitted subnational foreign affairs-related activities would almost certainly weigh down the
executive’s other responsibilities by consuming important resources

254. See id. It should be noted that Professor Goldsmith’s focus and description of this
approach deviates slightly from the manner in which I have presented it. Goldsmith focuses
primarily on the question of when the judicial branch should engage in making foreign relations law rather than that of what approach should be taken. See id. (“Another intermediate
solution is that courts should make federal foreign relations law only when the executive
branch officially suggests . . . that the foreign relations interests of the United States require
such law.”).
255. See id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1709.
259. See id.
260. Id.
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and politicizing previously nonpolitical issues.261 Therefore, the executive suggestion approach to construing the foreign relations effects test should also be avoided due to internal defects and weaknesses.
c. Sitting in judgment. The “sitting in judgment” approach constitutes a third possible manner of framing the foreign relations effects test. Under this approach, subnational activities are considered
to have impermissible direct effects on foreign relations if they require subnational officials to “sit in judgment” on foreign governments’ policies and practices.262 Notably, the Supreme Court’s construction of the effects test in Zschernig heavily incorporated this
approach into its general framework.263
At first glance, this approach appears to offer a straightforward,
judicially manageable method of defining permissible subnational
participation in foreign affairs. Upon closer inspection, however, the
sitting in judgment formula also suffers from a significant internal inconsistency. Simply put, prohibiting subnational actors from sitting
in judgment on foreign nations’ policies and practices in the foreign
affairs context directly conflicts with their ability to engage in such
conduct in other contexts. For example, in their respective concurring and dissenting opinions in Zschernig v. Miller,264 Justices Harlan
and White objected to the majority’s application of the “sitting in
judgment” standard to invalidate the Oregon law because states were
authorized to make critical judgments of foreign nations in other
contexts.265 As Justice Harlan stated:
[T]he Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act provides that a foreign-country money judgment shall not be recognized if it “was rendered under a system which does not provide
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements
of due process of law.” When there is a dispute as to the content of
foreign law, the court is required under the common law to treat
the question as one of fact and to consider any evidence presented
as to the actual administration of the foreign legal system. And in
the field of choice of law there is a nonstatutory rule that the tort

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

See id.
See HENKIN, supra note 174, at 164.
See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
389 U.S. 429 (1968).
See id. at 461-62 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 462 (White, J., dissenting).
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law of a foreign country will not be applied if that country is shown
to be “uncivilized.”266

“Surely,” Justice Harlan concluded, “all of these rules possess the
same ‘defect’ as the [Oregon] statute now before us. Yet I assume
that the Court would not find them unconstitutional.”267
As Louis Henkin points out, a similar contextual inconsistency
exists with respect to a Florida state statute.268 The Florida Territorial
Waters Act of 1963 required aliens to receive a license to fish in the
state’s territorial waters, but it denied such licenses to vessels owned
by Communist states, “an alien Communist, . . . [and] other alien
vessels ‘on the basis of reciprocity or retorsion’ unless the State Department transmitted a formal suggestion that the state of the vessel
[was] a friendly ally or neutral.”269 In a case tried under the Act, the
court sustained the Act despite the fact that it required state officials
to “sit in judgment” on foreign governments in the process of determining whether to award a license to a Communist- or alienowned vessel.270
The “sitting in judgment” approach to construing the foreign relations effects test thus should be considered defective because its
prohibitions on subnational actors’ ability to judge foreign nations’
policies and practices in the foreign affairs context directly conflicts
with their ability to engage in such conduct in other contexts.
d. Motive review. A notable element of the First Circuit’s formulation of the foreign relations effects test in Natsios, the motive review approach asks whether “the design and intent of [a particular
subnational action] is to affect the affairs of a foreign country.”271 If
found to have such a purpose, the action would be deemed to have a
direct effect on foreign affairs, thereby rendering it impermissible.
Like several of the other approaches already presented, the impermissible purpose or motive approach offers the advantage of being easily administered by the courts.272 Moreover, the motive ap266. Id. at 461-62 (Harlan, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
267. Id. at 462.
268. See HENKIN, supra note 174, at 437 n.66.
269. Id. (citations omitted).
270. See id. (citation omitted).
271. National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 53 (1st Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999).
272. See Goldsmith, supra note 231, at 1711 (“[The motive review test] would also be
easier for courts to administer than an open-ended effects test. As many have pointed out,
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proach potentially narrows the scope of subnational activities subject
to proscription because most subnational acts “are facially neutral
and were not designed with the purpose of influencing U.S. foreign
relations.”273
Regardless of these potential benefits, however, the motive review approach suffers from several significant defects that render it
unserviceable in this context. First, motive review fails to satisfy the
requirements derived from the First Circuit’s formulation of the effects test in Natsios. Contrary to those requirements,274 motive review focuses on the facial validity of a subnational regulation rather
than the subnational actor’s application of the regulation. Moreover,
motive review that focuses on a regulation’s effects due to the presence of facial neutrality involves an inquiry made at a high level of
generality, a type of inquiry prohibited by the requirements.275
Second, the courts do not always favor employing motive review.
Though an impermissible motive may be obvious in some instances,
it is frequently not in others.276 Consequently, the courts “ha[ve]
been reluctant to probe legislative purpose” in other contexts.277
Motive review thus prevails as a flawed rather than beneficial approach to formulating the foreign relations effects test due to its failure to comply with the “Natsios requirements” as well as its own internal defects.
e. Balancing federal and state interests. In Natsios, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts urged the court to adopt a fifth possible
approach to the foreign relations effects test: “balance the nation’s
interests in a unified foreign policy against the particular interests of
an individual state.”278 Under such a balancing test, subnational actions would be permitted where the subnational interest underlying
the action outweighed the national interest in maintaining a unified
foreign policy.
courts are much better at smoking out impermissible purpose than they are at identifying,
weighing, and accommodating the effects of government action.”) (footnote omitted).
273. Id.
274. See supra Part IV.B.1.
275. See id.
276. See HENKIN, supra note 174, at 437-38 n.67.
277. Id. at 438 n.67 (citing Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662
(1981); United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S.
39 (1968); Tayyari v. New Mex. State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365 (D. N.M. 1980)).
278. National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 52 (1st Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999).
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The balancing approach proposed by Massachusetts presents several advantages that, at least initially, support its adoption. For example, a balancing test theoretically would allow subnational actors
to participate in international activities in which they have a direct
and substantial interest, while reserving those areas in which subnational interest is not as strong to federal control. Also, the U.S. judiciary is familiar with using balancing tests and currently employs such
tests to decide such complex issues as the applicability of the dormant Commerce Clause279 and, as Justice Scalia has noted,280 the
constitutionality of state acts that affect individual liberties.281
Despite these apparent advantages, Massachusetts’ balancing approach ultimately fails for several important reasons. First, as the First
Circuit correctly determined in Natsios, the Supreme Court’s construction of the foreign relations effects test remains incompatible
with balancing state and national interests. Rather than permitting
such balancing, the First Circuit observed, “Zschernig stands for the
principle that there is a threshold level of involvement in and impact
on foreign affairs which the states may not exceed.”282
Second, as Justice Scalia noted in the dormant Commerce Clause
context, the balancing of subnational and federal interests “is not
really appropriate, since the interests on both sides are incommensurate. It is more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a
particular rock is heavy.”283 Notably, this disparate and noncomparable relationship also exists between subnational interests in participating in the international arena and the federal interest in promoting national uniformity in foreign policy.
Third, though the courts may “make . . . ‘balancing’ judgments
in determining how far the needs of the State can intrude upon the
liberties of the individual,”284 inquiries that involve balancing subnational and federal interests relating to foreign affairs are, similar to
the dormant Commerce Clause analysis, “ill suited to the judicial

279. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
280. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
281. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988).
282. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 52.
283. Bendix Autolite Corp., 486 U.S. at 897 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
284. Id. (citation omitted).
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function and should be undertaken rarely if at all.”285 By nature, issues relating to foreign affairs are political and thus should be resolved by political processes. This seems to be the central message of
the Supreme Court’s statement in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise
Tax Board:286 “Congress—whose voice . . . is the Nation’s—[has the
responsibility] to evaluate whether the national interest is best served
by tax uniformity, or state autonomy.”287 Regardless of the internationally-oriented course of action taken by a subnational entity,
Congress has the discretion to preempt that action as well as the experience in weighing disparate state and federal interests in political
issues. Balancing state and federal interests in foreign affairs generally
should be left to Congress rather than the courts.
Fourth, the fact that a balancing test would require courts to
weigh individual state interests as they arose on a case-by-case basis
violates the Natsios requirement that the foreign relations effects test
be framed definitely and in a rule-like manner. As Justice Scalia
noted in the dormant Commerce Clause context, such methodology
lacks predictability, particularly in respect to issues that remain to be
decided.288 Thus, due to the fact that a balancing test by nature requires case-by-case analysis and gives little instruction as to how a
particular issue should be decided, the proposed balancing test fails
to meet the criteria established through the above critique of Natsios.
Massachusetts’ suggestion that the foreign relations effects test be
framed as a pure balancing test thus fails due to internal inconsistencies and defects.
3. A proposal with potential: the Maier limited balancing test
As the preceding discussion indicates, the majority of proposed
formulations of the foreign relations effects test should be considered
flawed because they either violate the requirements derived from the
First Circuit’s defective construction of the effects test in Natsios or
suffer from a separate, internal failing. Significantly, however, there
exists one promising proposal, suggested by Professor Harold G.
285. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
286. 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
287. Id. at 331.
288. See Bendix Autolite Corp., 486 U.S. at 897-98 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(“[T]he outcome of any particular still-undecided issue under the current [dormant Commerce Clause balancing] methodology is in my view not predictable . . . .”).
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Maier, which lacks such flaws and therefore should be adopted as the
standard by which courts determine the validity of subnational involvement in foreign affairs.
Unlike the previously discussed proposals, Maier’s formulation of
the foreign relations effects test purports to be based on a “careful
examination” of Zscherig and related cases dealing with “the allocation of [state and federal] authority when the state and federal governments have concurrent constitutional authority to deal with the
same subject matter.”289 The following three-factor test resulted
from his investigation:
(1) Does the limited constituency of the state provide an appropriate political context in which to make the policy judgment required to reach a decision?
(2) Is the pertinent information that must be weighed to determine the wisdom of the policy decision available to the state
decision maker(s)?
(3) Will any possible adverse effects of the decision fall upon the
entire nation or be localized within the state making the decision?290

“[T]aken together,” Maier asserted, these three questions “consolidate all the pertinent considerations alluded to by the courts during
the past 200 years in determining the exclusivity of national authority in state law cases touching on foreign affairs where there is no direct preemption by federal law.”291 Moreover, they “recognize[] the
importance of centralized decision making where national interests
must be protected from local influences, while preserving appropriate
residual state Tenth Amendment power in the particular field.”292
The Maier test thus frames the foreign relations effects test as a
three-factor analysis that deems subnational foreign affairs-related activities to have an impermissible direct effect on national foreign affairs if (1) the subnational constituency does not provide an appro289. Maier, supra note 82, at 838. Specifically, Maier derived his test from a comparison
of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52 (1941), De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), and “numerous other cases that address
this issue.” Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 839.
292. Id. at 838.
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priate political context in which to make a particular internationallyrelated policy decision, (2) the subnational constituency and/or
policymaker lacks sufficient information to make an informed judgment regarding that internationally-related policy decision, or (3)
adverse affects from the subnational actor’s activities affect the nation
at large rather than just the subnational actor. Admittedly, these determinations are not as easy to apply as several of the other proposed
approaches. It will require the courts to establish some further requirements regarding whether a subnational forum constitutes an
appropriate political context for a policy decision or whether subnational decision makers possess sufficient information to engage in a
particular area of policy making. Also, to avoid being fatally framed
at a high level of generality, the test needs to limit its examination of
possible adverse effects to those that might result from the country
or countries against which a particular subnational action is directed
rather than from the international community at large.
Nevertheless, the strengths of the Maier approach stem from two
sources. First, the manner in which the test is formulated sets category-like limits on excessive subnational participation in foreign affairs while simultaneously balancing the subnational actor’s interest
in the international subject matter and ability to make proper decisions against the national need for uniformity. Second, the Maier approach satisfies the requirements derived from Natsios and lacks internal defects that would warrant its being discarded.
Thus, the Maier approach’s construction of the federal relations
effects test prevails as the approach that the First Circuit should have
adopted in Natsios—and that the Supreme Court should adopt when
reviewing Natsios. Significantly, the Court’s adoption of this approach will “ensure that the values of local self-government that inform the federal structure can be effectively maintained without undue interference with the national conduct of foreign affairs.”293
V. CONCLUSION
The Massachusetts Burma Law constitutes one of the most significant developments to date in the evolution of constituent diplomacy and the foray of subnational actors into the arena of foreign affairs. Not only did the Massachusetts Burma Law enact the first state

293. Id. at 839.
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selective purchasing law of its kind but the First Circuit Court of
Appeals’ recent decision in National Foreign Trade Council v.
Natsios,294 which declared the Massachusetts Burma Law to be an invalid usurpation of federal authority over foreign affairs, has accentuated constitutional questions regarding the relationship between federalism and foreign affairs and other related issues.
Perhaps the most significant question raised by the First Circuit’s
decision in Natsios involves the manner in which courts should construe the foreign relations effects test established by the Supreme
Court in Zschernig v. Miller to determine the constitutionality of
subnational activities in foreign affairs. In Natsios, the First Circuit
formulated the effects test at a high degree of generality that focused
on various factual factors that, in the court’s view, demonstrated that
the Massachusetts Burma Law exerted an impermissibly direct effect
on United States foreign relations. However, a careful examination
of the court’s construction of the test and the ramifications of post–
Zschernig developments in U.S. constitutional law, global geopolitics, and global interdependence reveals that the court erred by construing the test too broadly and at a high level of generality that erroneously promoted exclusive federal authority over foreign affairs.
The major question derived from Natsios, therefore, is how
courts should formulate the foreign relations effects test so as to allow greater subnational participation while protecting national interests and preventing absolute federal exclusivity. Though scholars and
commentators have suggested various possible approaches, only Professor Harold G. Maier’s three-part, limited balancing test adequately accomplishes the task. The courts, therefore, should adopt
the Maier construction of the foreign relations effects test as the
proper standard by which to judge the validity of subnational forays
into foreign affairs like the Massachusetts Burma law.
Patrick J. Thurston

294. 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. granted, Natsios v. National Foreign Trade
Council, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999).
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